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Fox: Remedy for the Reluctant Parent: Physician's Liability for the Po

NOTES
REMEDY FOR THE RELUCTANT PARENT:
PHYSICIANS' LIABILITY FOR THE POST-STERILIZATION
CONCEPTION AND BIRTH OF UNPLANNED CHILDREN*
With the rapid proliferation of simple, effective birth control techniques
during the last decade,, the concept of family planning has been increasingly
popularized, and a large segment of American society now employs some
method of contraception 2 to avoid the birth of unplanned children. 3 Although
the birth control pill remains the most widely used contraceptive 4 a growing
number of families have recently turned to surgical sexual sterilization.6
Most contraceptive sterilizationsr are accomplished either by vasectomy7 of
the male or tubal ligation 8 of the female.9 Both of these relatively simple
surgical procedures are now often performed on an outpatient basis under
local anesthesia.10 Neither operation causes hormonal changes, 1 nor do they
significantly affect sexual behavior.1 2 Given the difficulties experienced by
many women with the pill and the intrauterine device, together with the high
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the spring 1974 quarter.
I. See A. GUTTMACHER, PREGNANCY, BIRTH, AND FAMILY PLANNING 308-43 (1973).

2.

See

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, MARITAL STATUS AND

FAMILY STATUS: MARCH 1970 (ser. P-20, No. 212, 1971).

3. According to estimates developed in the 1970 National Fertility Study conducted by
the Office of Population Research, 44% of all births to married women between 1966 and
1970 were unplanned; 15% were reported as never having been wanted. COMMIsSSION ON
POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, POPULATION AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 97
(1972) [hereinafter cited as COMNISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH].
4. See A. GUTTMACHER, supra note 1, at 313.
5. Approximately 15% of white married couples between the ages of 20 and 39 have had
sterilization operations. Thompson, Haverkamp & Drose, Sterilization of the Female, 70
ROCKY MT. MEDICAL J. April 1973, at 29.
6. Contraceptive sterilization is performed to prevent conception for purposes of family
limitation. It is to be distinguished from therapeutic sterilization performed to protect the
physical or mental health of the parent, and eugenic sterilization designed to prevent the
propagation of mental defectives and criminals. Driver, Population Policies of State Governments in the United States: Some Preliminary Observations, 15 VILL. L. REv. 818, 826-27
(1970). See generally Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit- Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO
ST. L.J. 591 (1966); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20 (1956).
7. Vasectomy is a simple operative procedure that interrupts the vas deferens to prevent
sperm from being ejaculated with other components of the semen. Hackett & Waterhouse,
Vasectomy - Reviewed, 116 Am. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 438, 443 (1973).
8. Tubal ligation surgically interrupts the Fallopian tubes so that eggs cannot enter the
uterine cavity where fertilization takes place. Thompson, Haverkamp & Drose, supra note 5.
at 431.
9. A. GUTTMACHIER, supra note 1, at 333.
10. Hackett 9- Waterhouse, supra note 7, at 440, 443.
11. Voluntary Sterilization,12 MEDICAL LETrER ON DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 72 (1970).
12. COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH, supra note 3, at 100.
[158]
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failure rates of other contraceptive methods, 13 the current interest in voluntary
sterilization is understandable.
Predictably, the increasing employment of such sterilization procedures
has generated questions involving the legal ramifications of the physician's
participation.14 There has been some concern that the sterilizing physician
might be subject to criminal liability, 5 but the current consensus of judicial 6
and scholarly7 opinion is that the imposition of criminal sanctions is unlikely. Moreover, the consent of the patient would probably be allowed as an
excuse in any event.'8
This note involves another area of present interest: the civil liability of
physicians performing voluntary sterilization operations. Of course, such
liability may arise from medical negligence involving issues indistinguishable
from those encountered in any other medical or surgical procedure.'9 When
one who has undergone contraceptive sterilization thereafter becomes a party
to the conception and birth of a normal child, however, novel questions of
liability and damages may arise in the patient's suit for recovery.
EXISTENCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

In determining the possible liability of the physician in a case of poststerilization conception, there are two preliminary questions: first, whether
allowing an action by the patient contravenes public policy; and second,
whether such an action may be supported as protecting a legally cognizable
right in the patient.
PublicPolicy
Although a fundamental common law principle requires that an injured
party be compensated for damages resulting from another's breach of duty,
there are some instances in which compelling considerations of public policy
It first appeared that the post-sterilization conhave precluded recovery.20
ception and birth of a child might be such an instance. In Shaheen v. Knight 2'
13. Id.
14. No case has been found in which a person who consented to a sterilization operation
brought suit against an attending physician prior to 1930. Miller 8: Dean, Liability of Physicians for Sterilization Operations,16 A.B.AJ. 158, 160 (1930).
15. Id. at 158; Note, Contraceptive Sterilization: The Doctor, the Patient, and the United
States Constitution,25 U. FLA. L. REV. 327, 330-32 (1973).

16. See Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.V. 620 (1934).
17. See Bravenec, Voluntary Sterilization as a Crime: Applicability of Assault and Battery
and of Mayhem, 6 J. FAMILY L. 94, 114, 127 (1966); Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 415, 429 (1965).
18. Wolf, Legal and PsychiatricAspects of Voluntary Sterilization, 3 J. FAMmY L. 103,
15171
118-19 (1963).
19. See Dunn v. Campbell, 166 So. 2d 217 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); West v. Underwood,
132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
20. W. PRossER, Lmw OF ToRTs §16, at 98, §131, at 970 (4th ed. 1971).
21. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County 1957).
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the plaintiff, who had undergone a vasectomy because he was financially unable to support additional children, sought to recover for the expense of
educating and maintaining a child conceived and born after the operation.
The court recognized the legitimacy of a contract for voluntary sterilization, 22
but found that the plaintiff had suffered no legally recognizable damage in
connection with his "blessed event": "We are of the opinion that to allow
damages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal
public sentiment of the people.... [T]o allow such damages would be against
public policy."

23

This conclusion has been rejected in several jurisdictions, 24 including
Florida's second appellate district,25 but the Shaheen perception of the public
conscience continues to present a convincing argument to some courts. Affirming a summary judgment against the parents of a healthy child conceived after
an unsuccessful tubal ligation, a Texas court 26 recently found that allowing
an action to recover the financial expenses of the care and maintenance of the
child was precluded by public policy founded upon "recognition of the fam27
ily's importance to our society."
Basing a decision entirely upon the court's perception of public opinion
is a disconcerting judicial practice. Courts may properly declare and apply the
public policy of the community only when it is the subject of a virtual
unanimity of opinion.2 8 While the Shaheen decision recognized this principle,
the court's consistency in its application is debatable. After finding no public
consensus against the practice of voluntary sterilization, -9 the court nevertheless must necessarily have observed popular agreement that injuries resulting
from the failure of sterilization to prevent childbirth are not worthy of legal
redress3 0 The court's determination that the purpose of sterilization was condemned by the same public that found contraceptive sterilization itself unobjectionable is apparently inconsistent.
Additionally, courts making policy decisions may rely upon outdated
judicial pronouncements of public opinion that, although accurate when
made, are not representative of the current conviction of the community. The
Shaheen court cited a decision that antedated its deliberations by 110 years

22. Id. at 43.
23. Id. at 45-46; accord, Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.), rev'd on other
grounds,488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 F.2d 201 (1964).
24. E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
25. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
26. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (rex. App. 1973).
27. Id. at 127.
28. E.g., Harlan v. City of Tucson, 82 Ariz. 111, 309 P.2d 244 (1957); Lurie v. Republican
Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 192 A.2d 367 (1963); Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 17 A.2d 407 (1941).
29. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43; accord, Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79
Cal. Rptr. 359 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391
P.2d 201 (1964).
30. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45.
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for the proposition that: "The great end of matrimony is not the comfort and
convenience of the immediate parties ... but the procreation of a progeny
having a legal title to maintenance by the father .... "31
The assertion that recovery of expenses related to childbirth would be
repugnant to a general belief that the principal purpose of marriage is procreation is hardly supportable today.32 The widespread use of contraceptive
devices, 33 state3 4 and federal3 5 government support and advancement of birth
control, and the growing public awareness of the consequences of threatened
overpopulation 6 all evidence a contrary public consciousness.
Furthermore, there are several axioms of "social engineering"3 7 that support recovery. One is that losses, which must necessarily fall upon one party
or another, should be borne by the individual best able to distribute the risk
of loss through such mechanisms as fee adjustments and liability insurance.35
Another is that the threat of liability to one in control of a transaction or
interaction with another furnishes a strong incentive for him to prevent the
occurrence of potential harm.39 While such considerations are not controlling,
they are nevertheless significant in militating against a denial of recovery upon
public policy grounds.
Interest Protected
Aside from the policy debate concerning the propriety of such a course,
strong legal arguments exist for judicially protecting the right of persons to
prevent the birth of unplanned children. That such a right is included within
0
a broader constitutional guarantee of personal privacy was first suggested in
4
Griswold v. Connecticut,3 in which the United States Supreme Court found
that a state statute outlawing voluntary birth control "would unjustifiably
31. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847).
32. Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 618 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 253, 187 N.W.2d 511, 516 (1971).
33. See A. GUTrMACHER, supra note 1.
34. See, e.g., CAL. WErL. & INST. CODE §§14500-501 (West Supp. 1974); FLa. STAT. §381.382
(1973) (directing the Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services to implement a comprehensive
family planning program designed to include prescription for and provision of all medically
recognized methods of contraception to citizens of childbearing age).
35. See, e.g., Family Planning Services and Population Research Act, 42 U.S.C. §300
(1970); 42 U.S.C. §2809(a)(6) (1973) (authorizing federal development and support of special
programs in family planning).
36. Cf. Waldheim, World Population Year: The Beginning of a Better Future, PAPrTS'
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1974, at 20; Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Oct. 25, 1974, §B at 7, col. 1.
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §3, at 15, citing Pound, Theory of Social Interests, 4
PUBLICATION Am.SOCIOLOGICAL SOC'Y 15 (1920).
38. See generally Freezer, Capacity To Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain
Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930).
39. See W. PROSSER, supranote 20, §5, at 23.

40. It is said that this broad right of privacy embraces other areas, but it is presently
established only in the area of procreative self-determinations. See Commentary, Pregnancy,
Privacy, and the Constitution: The Court at the Crossroads, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 779, 788

(1973).
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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intrude on rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected." ' 2
Although Griswold tailored the scope of its holding to the facts of the case,
dictum in Eisenstadt v. Baird43 indicated that the guarantee of procreative
self-determination is an individual right 44 not limited to the context of a
45
marital relationship.
Further uncertainty, engendered by the fragmentation of the Griswold
decision into four divergent opinions by the majority concerning the con47
stitutional source of the right,46 was recently dispelled in Roe v. Wade.
48
There, the Court found that a Texas criminal abortion statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed to distinguish abortions performed
early in pregnancy from those performed later, and because it provided legal
justification for abortion only when necessary to save the life of the mother. 49
Basing the guarantee of privacy exclusively on the fourteenth amendment's
concept of personal liberty, the Court found that this right includes a woman's
decision to continue or to terminate her pregnancy.50
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Wade appear to have firmly established the
proposition that the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy encompasses
a right of procreative self-determination. 5 ' If a person has the constitutionally
protected right to prevent potential pregnancy with contraceptive devices and
to terminate existing pregnancy by surgical abortion, it would seem clear that
the decision to prevent the same pregnancy by contraceptive sterilization is
also within the established scope of that right. Although not unqualified,52
the right is fundamental,-- and it is unlikely that there exists a compelling
state interest sufficient to subject the decision to sterilize to any significant
legal restriction.
In Wade the Court decided that the legitimate state interest in preserving
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman54 does not become compelling until mortality in abortion is no longer less than mortality in normal
childbirth. 55 Because the risk of death from tubal ligation compares favorably

42.

Id. at 497.

43. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
44. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
45. See Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIANI L. REv.
395, 401 (1971).
46. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965).

47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§1191-94 (1961).
49. 410 U.S. at 164.
50. Id. at 153.
51. See note 40 supra.
52. 410 U.S. at 154-55.
53. Id. at 152, 155.
54. The second important and legitimate state interest recognized by the Court, that of
protecting the "potential life" of a viable fetus, id. at 162-63, does not pertain to instances
of contraceptive sterilization.
55. Id. at 163.
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to the risk of death from pregnancy in childbirth, 6 and because there is
virtually no mortality risk in vasectomy,57 there would be no demonstrably
compelling state interest in regulating the decision to employ contraceptive
sterilization. 8
If the state may not infringe upon the right of procreative self-determination, then it follows that courts may not constitutionally denigrate the decision to undergo contraceptive sterilization 5 9 by refusing on public policy
grounds to impose civil liability on physicians by whose breach of duty the
purpose of sterilization is defeated.60
THEoRIs OF RECOVERY

Assuming that recovery does not contravene any existing public policy, a
number of legal avenues may be employed to establish a cause of action in the
case of post-sterilization conception.
ProfessionalNegligence
Professional negligence under tort law may be successful grounds for imposing civil liability upon the attending physician if he has failed to exercise
ordinary care in applying that degree of knowledge and skill commonly possessed by medical men practicing in, the same or similar communities. 61
Initially, a physician may fail to meet this standard during preoperative consultation 2 by neglecting to give the patient sufficient information about the
contemplated sterilization, thus preventing him from making a meaningful
decision concerning whether to submit to the operation.63 For instance, in
Florida the physician must inform his patient of any measurable risk of
failure,64 and he must explain to the patient the available alternative methods
of birth control.65 Without this information the patient's consent may be
negated,6 6 thereby exposing the physician to liability for battery or pro67
fessional negligence.

56. Thompson, Haverkamp &Drose, supra note 5, at 30.
57. Davis, Vasectomy, 72 Amr. J. NURSING 509 (1972).
58. In practice, however, this decision may be controlled by nongovernment bodies such
as hospital abortion and sterilization committees. See Note, A Woman's Right to Voluntary
Sterilization,22 BuFFALo L. Rxv. 291, 297-98 (1972).
59. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
60. See Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 618 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
61. E.g., Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1956); Hill v. Boughton, 146
Fla. 505, 1 So. 2d 610 (1941).
62. See generally Hackett &Waterhouse, supra note 7, at 442.
63. See Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
64. Id.

65. Cf. Russell v. Hardwick, 166 So. 2d 904 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
66. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 313, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 858, 363-70, 409 P.2d 74, 79-86 (1965).
67. Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d 125 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). See also O'Grady v. Wickman,
213 So. 2d 321 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
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The physician's negligent performance of the sterilization operation is at
once the most obvious cause of action and the most difficult to prove in the
case of subsequent conception. Any evidence of negligent surgery is internally
concealed. Furthermore, the patient is without the benefit of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur68 because conception after sterilization is not an event that
"ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence." 69 There
exists a measurable chance of recanalization, 7° a spontaneous regeneration of
the vas deferens or the Fallopian tubes that restores fertility, and this may
occur despite proper surgical skill and technique. 71 Consequently, the mere
failure of a sterilization operation to produce sterility has not been held by
courts to establish surgical negligence.72
Nevertheless, it is possible to prove operative negligence under certain circumstances. In Bishop v. Byrne73 it was alleged that one of the plaintiff's
Fallopian tubes was found to be intact at the time of a Caesarean birth two
years after defendant physician had performed a tubal ligation. In denying a
motion for summary judgment, the court found that this allegation, if proved,
74
was sufficient to establish defendant physician's negligence.
Professional negligence may also occur in the case of a vasectomy if the
physician fails to perform adequate postoperative tests7 5 to verify the definite
sterility of the patient,76 or if he fails to advise the patient of the necessity of
employing other methods of contraception until tests are complete.7 7 In Ball
v. Mudge,7 8 however, the plaintiff was unable to show that failure to make a
postoperative semen analysis constituted professional negligence because he
could present no evidence of a definite medical standard of practice in the
community in that regard.79 The chance that this barrier might prevent future

68.

See Brown v. Swindal, 121 So. 2d 38 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1960). See generally West Coast

Hosp. Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1951).
69. V. PROSSER, supra note 20, §39, at 214; cf. Hine v. Fox, 89 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1956).
70. The incidence of failure for vasectomy is estimated at less than 1%, whid is slightly
better than that for tubal ligation. Davis, supra note 57, at 509-10.

71. See Franblau, Spontaneous Reanastomosis of the Vas Deferens, 70 ROCKY MT. MEDICAL
J., Sept. 1973, at 35.
72. See Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d
247, 249, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (1964).
73. 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).
74. Id. at 463-64. Even in this situation, the plaintiff may encounter the barrier of the
unwillingness of members of the medical profession to testify against one another. See Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 158 (1966).
75. Cf. Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188 So. 815 (1939).
76. In Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ky. 1971), an expert medical witness
testified that giving at least three tests was standard procedure.
77. The vas tubes above the point of vasectomy contain an amount of sperm that is
reduced by each succeeding ejaculation until the tubes are empty, before which time the
patient remains fertile. Davis, supra note 57, at 511.
78. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
79. It appears that the court followed the narrow "same locality" standard even though
Washington recognized the more liberal "similar localities" rule, Hoover v. Goss, 2 Wash. 2d
237, 97 P.2d 689 (1940), which is also applied in Florida. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So.
2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1956).
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recoveries is substantially diminished in light of increasing medical familiarity
with the operation 8o and the expanding judicial inclination to apply more
liberal standards in determining acceptable medical practice.8 '
In the event that a physician advises his patient that sexual intercourse is
safe immediately following vasectomy during the period in which postoperative tests should be conducted, an action in negligent misrepresentation might
also arise.8 2 When a statement is made by a physician with knowledge that his
patient will rely upon it,83 he is under a duty to exercise the degree of skill
and competence required by the medical standard in ensuring that his representations are true.8 4 It is unlikely, however, that an action in deceit or
fraudulent misrepresentation will lie in such a case because the element of
fraudulent intent is generally absent.85
Breach of a Contract To Sterilize
In addition to actions in negligence against the attending physician, pregnancy subsequent to a sterilization operation may give rise to a claim based
upon breach of contract. Contracts for the achievement of certain medical results are generally not implied, 8 and a physician is not an insurer of the success of his treatment.8 7 Nevertheless, a physician and his patient are free to
make an express contract for a particular result, in which case he may be liable
for a breach of contract if he does not succeed.88
Thus, if a physician informs his patient that a proposed operation will result in certain sterilization without qualifying his assurance by disclosing the
risk of failure through spontaneous recanalization, a court may find that an
express warranty of success has been created, and that the patient is entitled to
recover for its breach in the event of a subsequent pregnancy. 89 Because these
80. See Dees, Vasectomy: Problems of Follow Up, 66

PROCE.DiNGS ROYAL

SoC. MEDICINE

52 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1956); Pederson v. Dumouchel,
72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
82. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 814, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 470 (Dist. Ct App.
1967).
83. A patient is particularly justified in relying upon the representations of a physician,
since the latter holds himself out as an expert. W. PROSSE, supra note 20, §109, at 727. But
see Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.
1972), where plaintiff's reliance upon defendant physician's representation that the plaintiff was sterile was held to be unreasonable when the plaintiff knew that he had impregnated
his wife after the sterilization operation but prior to the semen analysis upon which the
physician's opinion was based.
84. Young v. Metropolitan Dade County, 201 So. 2d 594 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); cf. Watson
v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899).
85. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934); Hays v.
Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. App.), rev'd on other grounds,488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
86. Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 1 So. 2d 610 (1941); Adkins v. Hume, 107 So. 2d 253
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
87. Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
88. Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Robins v. Firestone, 308
N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
89. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Vilord v. Jenkins, 226 So. 2d 245 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
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circumstances could also give rise to a right of action in negligence, the plaintiff might phrase his pleadings differently, depending on the applicable statutes of limitations9" and the relative burdens of proof in tort 91 and contract.92
To recover in contract for an unwanted pregnancy and childbirth after
sterilization, a plaintiff must establish three elements . 3 First, he must show
that a contract with a warranty of successful sterilization existed. If the contract is reduced to writing, the plaintiff need only introduce the instrument
into evidence, but few physicians who have been so precise as to provide a
prepared contract would be so injudicious as to omit a clause disclaiming any
94
warranty of result.
If the contract is oral, the plaintiff may encounter several difficulties.
While the burden of presenting substantial evidence of the existence of a
contract may be easily satisfied by the plaintiff's own testimony, carrying the
ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder of its existence in the face of the
physician's denial will be more difficult. 95 Furthermore, if the warranty of
sterility is made after the agreement to operate has been reached, it must be
supported by independent consideration in order to be binding. 96 Finally, it
is possible that the court might construe any oral guarantee of success to be
merely words of reassurance, uttered for their therapeutic effect on the patient.97

The second element that the plaintiff must establish in order to recover is
that the terms of the contract were breached. In the case of a tubal ligation,
medical evidence of the plaintiff's subsequent pregnancy would be conclusive.
On the other hand, vasectomizing a husband does not guarantee his exclusive
sexual access to his wife, and her subsequent pregnancy is not itself irrefutable
evidence that an alleged warranty of sterility has been breached. 98 Any de90. See Manning v. Serrano, 97 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1957); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d
332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Note, Sterilization and Family Planning-The Physician's Liability, 56 GEO. L.J. 976, 989-90 (1968). But see FLA. STAT. §95.11(6) (1973), amending FLA.
STAT. §95.11(6) (1971), providing that actions to recover damages for injuries arising from
any medical treatment or surgical operation must be brought within two years after the
cause of action has accrued, wbich occurs when the plaintiff discovers, or through use of
reasonable care should have discovered, the injury. See also Larsson v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hosp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 704, 218 P.2d 604 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Fradley v. Dade County, 187
So. 2d 47 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
91. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
92. While the proof in contract may often be easier, this advantage can be obtained
only at some cost, since allowable damages for a breach of contract do not include the
patient's pain and suffering as in negligent malpractice actions. Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla.
182, 200 So. 541 (1941).
93. Sagall, Surgical Sexual Sterilization, 8 TRIAL 57, 60 (1972).
94. See generally Hackett & Waterhouse, supra note 7, at 446; Note, supra note 15, at 349.
95. See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 248-49, 391 P.2d 201, 203 (1964).
96. Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 171, 211 P. 289, 293 (1927), overruled on other
grounds, A.T. Klemens & Sons v. Reber Plumbing F, Heating Co., 139 Mont. 115, 360 P.2d
1005 (1961). See also Fogarty v. Van Loan, 344 Mass. 530, 533, 183 N.E.2d 111, 113 (1962)
(sale of goods):
97. See Marvin v. Talbott, 216 Cal. App. 2d 383, 389-90, 30 Cal. Rptr. 893, 897 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 110, 191 N.E.2d 436, 443 (1963).
98. Note, supra note 17, at 434.
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fense based upon a theory of adultery, however, would encounter the procedural obstacles of the presumption that the child of a married woman is
legitimate 99 and the common law rule that neither spouse may testify to nonintercourse so as to circumstantially show the illegitimacy of a child born in

wedlock. 0 0 Moreover, any evidence relevant to such a defense would normally
be particularly within the control of the plaintiff.
Finally, in order to recover for breach of a contract to sterilize, the patient
must show that his claimed elements of recovery are legally cognizable as

damages, particularly if one of these is for the uncomplicated birth of a
normal child. This indispensable element of proof has consistently been the
most difficult for the plaintiff to establish, whether his claim was grounded in
contract or in tort.
DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES

Even though a plaintiff may be able to establish breach of an express
warranty of permanent sterility or a breach of duty amounting to professional
negligence, the cases suggest a reluctance on the part of some courts to permit
recovery of damages.
Contract
0
Thornby'1

In Christensen v.
the vasectomized plaintiff sought to recover
on a warranty of sterilization for anxiety and the expenses incident to the
birth of a subsequently conceived child. The court found that the purpose of
the operation was to save plaintiff's wife from the hazards incident to childbirth, and that because the wife had survived, the injuries complained of
were too remote to support recovery.10 2 The court appears to have relied upon
the traditional rule1 03 that consequential damages arising from a breach of
contract are limited to those injuries that the defendant had reason to foresee
as the probable result of breach at the time he made his promise. 04 Thus, the
case does not stand for the proposition that there may be no recovery for consequential damages when the action is grounded in tort. 05
Nor is Christensen authority for denying a recovery on the contract of the
expenses of birth or even the expenses associated with rearing the child when
the purpose of the operation is to limit the size of the family. Under such circumstances the physician might naturally foresee these injuries as the probable
result of a breach of the contract. Furthermore, some courts have rejected the
99. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944).
100. Kennelly v. Davis, 216 So. 2d 795, 797 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), aft'd, 221 So. 2d 415
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 916 (1970).
101. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
102. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
103. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); see L. SIPnsoN, CONTRAars §196, at 395 (2d ed. 1965).
104. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry. v. Thomas, 60 Fla. 412, 53 So. 510 (1910); Olin's, Inc. v. Avis
Rental Car Sys., Inc., 172 So. 2d 250 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1965).
105. Cf. Hamilton v. Walker Chem. & Exterminating Co., 233 So. 2d 440 (4th D.C.A. Fla.

1970).
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strictures of contract law when dealing with contracts for a particular medical
result, allowing recovery of damages commonly associated only with actions in
tort.1 0 6

Tort
While contract damages attempt to place the plaintiff in the position he
would have occupied had the contract been fulfilled, 10 7 the purpose of compensation in tort is to restore the plaintiff to the position in which he would
have been if the wrong had not been committed.0 8 Thus, in an action
grounded in professional negligence, recovery may be had for "any loss or
damage proximately resulting from such negligence."' 10 9
Many of the elements of damage arising from a physician's negligence in
connection with a sterilization operation are those commonly recovered in
malpractice actions. Medical expenses incurred by the sterilized patient would
be recoverable, 110 including the expenses resulting from the pregnancy' 1 ' and
the cost of a second sterilization operation." 2 Damages have also been allowed
for the pain and suffering of pregnancy and childbirth. 1 3 Further, the husband's right to recover for loss of consortium - the services, society, and
companionship of his wife of which he is deprived during her pregnancy - has
been generally recognized by the cases." 4 Even if a husband has suffered some
mental worry or anxiety as a result of the circumstances of his wife's pregnancy, however, courts have refused to allow damages either on the grounds
that one may not recover for mental suffering unaccompanied by any physical
injury, 1 5 or because the defendant could not reasonably anticipate any harm
106. See, e.g., Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 82 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Robins v. Firestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); cf. Florida E. Coast R.R. v. Peters, 72 Fla. 311,
73 So. 151 (1916).
107. Hodges v. Fries, 34 Fla. 63, 15 So. 682 (1894).
108. Florida G. & P.R.R. v. Foxworth, 40 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899).
109. West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 326, 40 A.2d 610, 611 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
110. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Harby v.
Florida E. Coast Hotel Co., 59 Fla. 280, 52 So. 193 (1910).
111. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260-61, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
112. See Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 326, 40 A.2d 610, 611 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945); cf. Anclote Manor
Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
113. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967). In Bishop v. Byrne the court took judicial notice of the fact that a period of pregnancy followed by the birth of a child by Caesarean section would cause the mother physical
injury, physical pain and suffering, and mental worry an anxiety. 265 F. Supp. 460, 464
(S.D.W. Va. 1967). Contract damages for breach of warranty of sterility, however, do not
normally include the patient's pain and suffering. Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 337,
220 N.E.2d 767, 769 (1966). But see Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957),
where the court allowed such damages in a contract action for a surgeon's failure to perform
a Caesarean operation.
114. See, e.g., West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 326, 40 A.2d 610, 619 (Ct. Err. & App.
1945); Milde v. Leigh, 28 N.W.2d 530, 537 (N.D. 1947).
115. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); cf. Gilliam v. Stewart,
291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
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to the husband and so owed him no duty of care. 18
The wife's lost wages also have been held to be a collectable item of damages. 117 There may be some argument that there can be no recovery for that
portion of the damages that could have been avoided had she continued her
employment until it became medically inadvisable, and had she returned to
work as soon as she was physically able." 8 Under the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, however, a plaintiff has a duty to do only what a reasonably
prudent person acting under the existing facts and circumstances would do to
prevent aggravation of her injuries."19 Because the mental and physical strains
of pregnancy are particularly subjective, 20 it would be difficult to convince a
finder of fact that a plaintiff's personal decision to stop working was un2
reasonable under the circumstances.' '
Dicta in several recent decisions 22 have suggested that if other children are
deprived of some portion of the "society, comfort, care, protection and support' 2 3 of the mother that they would have received had the unplanned child
not been born, then this loss should be compensable. If so, the recovery would
be without precedent. 2 4 Only one decision, 25 subsequently reversed, has found
a legally recognizable right in a child to proper parental care. The denial of
recovery in a situation involving so obvious an injury is manifestly unjust,' 2 6
and possible support for a recovery by the child can be drawn from recent
cases that depart from longstanding common law precedent to find a right on
the part of a wife to the services of her husband similar to the husband's right
to consortium.' 27 Nevertheless, the dear weight of authority is against treating
the siblings' loss as a recoverable item of damages. 2 8
In summary, the courts have generally allowed recovery in this area for

116. Cf. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 126, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §54, at 333.
117. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). See also Seltzer v.
Grine, 79 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1955).
118. Most physicians believe there is no harm in women continuing to work until about
six weeks before the baby is due, returning to work six weeks after birth. R. MrrcHar. &
T. KLEIN, NrNE MONTHS To Go 69 (1969).
119. See Ballard & Ballard v. Pelaia, 73 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 1954).
120. See R. MrrcauxuL & T. KLEm,supra note 118, at 72.
121. See Sheppard, Negligent Interference with Birth Control Practices, 11 S. TEX. L.J.
229, 259 (1969).
122. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616, 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Terrell v. Garcia, 496

S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. App. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
123. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
124. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §125, at 896.
125. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (9*. Hawaii 1955), rev'd, 244 F.2d 604 (9th
Cir. 1957).
126. See 42 COmNELL L.Q. 115 (1956).
127. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406,

170 N.E.2d 811 (1960).

128. See, e.g., Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952); Hoffman
v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57 (1962).
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what might be considered typical malpractice damages: medical expenses, pain
and suffering, husband's loss of consortium, and lost wages. The one case expressly denying recovery on these items was an action in contract that was
subject to legal limitations on recovery not present in tort.
Offset for IncidentalBenefits
Although the appellate court in Ball v. Audge1 2 9 refused to reverse a
verdict and judgment for the defendant on the grounds that a jury could have
reasonably found that the expenses incidental to the birth of a child conceived
after plaintiff's vasectomy were "far outweighed by the blessing of a cherished
child, albeit an unwanted child at the time of conception and birth,' 1 30 the
court did not expressly preclude recovery of such damages in similar actions.
The tenor of that decision was, however, indicative of the position taken by
some courts when confronted with a suit for recovery of a more controversial
item of damages: the expenses of maintaining, supporting, and educating a
child whose conception and birth have followed an attempted sterilziation
operation.
Shaheen v. Knightl31 held that the benefits derived by the plaintiff from
the birth - "the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff Shaheen will have in
the rearing and educating of this . . . child"'132 - outweighed the expenses

thereby incurred as a matter of law, a finding that had the effect of completely
negating liability. A recent Texas case' 33 made a classic statement of the
rationale that underlies such a decision:
Who can place a price tag on a child's smile or the parental pride in a
child's achievement? Even if we consider only the economic point of
view, a child is some security for the parents' old age. Rather than attempt to value these intangible benefits, our courts have simply determined that public sentiment recognizes that these benefits to the parents
outweigh their economic loss in rearing and educating a healthy,
normal child."3

These cases fail to recognize that for people who resort to sterilization to
prevent the birth of children, the values of having a child may not always
outweigh the financial and personal considerations motivating their initial
action. This weakness was recognized by a Florida court, 13G which rejected a
similar ationale by observing that "the fallacy in appellee's argument is clear:
1
he suggests as vitiating liability a fact which mitigates damages." l6
This position was first suggested in Custodio v. Bauer.Y' Plaintiff had
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204.
11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County 1957).
Id. at 45-46.
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App. 1973).
Id. at 128.
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
Id. at 503.
251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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undergone a tubal ligation to avoid aggravation of a then existing bladder and
kidney condition and to improve her emotional and nervous condition. When
she later became pregnant, she brought actions in both tort and contract
against the operating physicians. Among other damages, plaintiff sought to
recover for the expenses of rearing the unplanned child. When the defendants
imposed a defense based upon the Shaheen rationale, the court applied the
benefit rule expressed in the Restatement of Torts:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a
special benefit, to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable.138
Identifying "the interest which was harmed" by the unplanned birth as that
interest, which the sterilization operation was intended to protect, the court
allowed an offset to the extent that the failure of the sterilization operation
and the ensuing pregnancy benefited either the emotional and nervous makeup
of the plaintiff or her other medical conditions. 1 9
While the Custodio application of the benefit rule is as contemplated by
the Restatement,1 40 it has been criticized as being too narrow to be applied
literally in this area.1 41 For instance, if the sterilization were motivated by
economic necessity, only economic benefits from the child would mitigate recovery. While it is true that juries in wrongful death actions have consistently
found the economic value of a child's services to be substantial, 42 it is generally recognized that these evaluations are largely illusory.'43 As there is no
apparent reason to extend this fiction into another area, the offset allowed for
the economic benefits from an unplanned child would be nominal, allowing
the parents full recovery of their consequential economic damages in virtually
every case. If the overriding benefit approach of Shaheen is unfair to the
parents in some cases, the qualified benefit rule of Custodio is equally unfair
to the defendant physician in others.
Both positions have been rejected in favor of a more flexible approach in
two subsequent decisions. 4 4 Troppi v. Scarf 45 was an action by parents of an
unplanned child against a pharmacist who had negligently filled their prescription for birth control pills with tranquilizers. Although the facts are
distinguishable from those in the sterilization cases, the issues involved in
138. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS §920, at 616 (1939) (emphasis added).
139. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
140. See generally RESEATFMENT OF TORTS §920, comment b at 617 (1972).
141. See 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 666, 670 (1972).
142. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §127, at 909.
143. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971);
WVycko v. Grodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); cf. Gresham v. Courson, 177 So.
2d 33 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
144. Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
145. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
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determining damages are the same. After quoting the Restatement rule, the
court went on to say:
Since pregnancy and its attendant anxiety, incapacity, pain and suffering are inextricably related to child bearing, we do not think it would
be sound to attempt to separate those segments of damage from the
economic costs of an unplanned child in applying the "same interest"
rule. Accordingly, the benefits of the unplanned child may be weighed
against all the elements of claimed damage.16
This more flexible standard allows the trier of fact to make a total evaluation of all factors that aggravate or attenuate the impact of the unplanned
child upon the parents. Among the circumstances that the trier must consider
in determining the extent to which the birth of a particular child represents a
benefit to his parents are family size, family income, age of the parents, and
marital status.

14 7

Purpose of Sterilization
Of primary importance in evaluating the injuries sustained by the parents
is the purpose for which the sterilization was intended. In the case of a
therapeutic sterilization - one designed solely to protect the physical or psychological well-being of the mother 4 - the normal pregnancy and uneventful
birth of a child that leaves the mother unimpaired4 9 would almost inevitably
be construed as conferring a greater benefit upon the parents than the injury
resulting from the temporary anxieties and discomforts of pregnancy. 15 0 Similarly, the failure of sterilizations intended to prevent the birth of retarded or
deformed children will likely cause no lasting injury if a normal child is
52
born.' 5' Conversely, if an abnormal child is born under such circumstances,'
the continuing parental anxiety in addition to the cost of special care and attention that handicapped children often require may lead the finder of fact to
a determination that substantial damage has resulted.
Sterilization is often economically motivated: low income families may be
unable to support additional children, 5 3 and higher income families may wish

146.

Id. at 55, 187 N.W.2d at 518.

147. Id. at 57, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
148. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Milde v. Leigh, 28 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1947).
149. The mother's death in childbirth from foreseeable complications of the pregnancy
would presumably give rise to an action in wrongful death. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See generally FLA. STAT. §758.19
(1973), which provides for recovery for death caused by "wrongful act, negligence . . . or
breach of contract or warranty."
150. See Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
151. See Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 403, 406 (Tex. App.), rev'd on other grounds,
488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973).
152. See Doer v. Villate, 74 11. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
153. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App. 1973); Ball v. Mudge, 64
Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
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to sustain their present economic status.' 54 Under either traditional tort or
contract formula, 155 the parents' damages are determined by the amount that
will enable them to maintain their previous standard of living while fulfilling
their legal obligation to support the additional child.156 It has been suggested
that the damages should rather be measured by that amount that is normally
spent in rearing the average child because it seems inequitable to allow a

larger recovery to a wealthy parent than to a poor one. 157 It is also inequitable,
however, to require the negligent physician to place the parents in a better

position than they originally occupied. Furthermore, the suggestion meets with
the conceptual legal obstacles that the cause of action is not in the child'5 8
but in the parents, 59 and that damages are allowed not to compensate the
child, but to "replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not
deprive the other members of the family of what was planned as their just

share of the family income."' 6 0
Since the rate of success in attempted reversals of surgical sterilization is
now only about thirty per cent,1 61 it is not likely to be presently employed as
a method of temporary contraception by those who plan eventually to have
children. Current experimentation with occlusive plugs and control valves
nevertheless indicates that temporary sterilization may soon become a recog62
In that
nized alternative to other nonpermanent methods of birth control.

event, the failure of the sterilization would merely accelerate the birth of a

child who was unplanned only in the sense of being untimely.6 3 Since the

injuries resulting from such a birth would not usually be of an ongoing
nature, as when the sterilization is designed for permanent purposes, the dam-

ages allowable would be considerably less than in other cases.
Difficulty in DeterminingDamages
Although it may now be recognized that the birth of a child is not so
universally held to be a blessing that it must be considered to be beneficial as
154. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming County 1957).
155. See text accompanying notes 107-108 supra.
156. See, e.g., Futch v. Johnson, 101 Fla. 328, 134 So. 791 (1931); Nelson v. Richwagen,
326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950).
157. See Note, supra note 90, at 995.
158. Courts have universally held that there exists no right in a child to compensation
for injuries caused by his birth. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 i1. App. 2d 240, 190 NXE.2d
849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (suit by child against father for having caused
him to be born out of wedlock); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (19&7) (suit
by deformed child against physician for negligence in failing to inform parents of the possibility of a deformed child after mother contracted German measles, thus permitting parents
to seek abortion); Pinkey v. Pinkey, 198 So. 2d 52 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967) (suit by child
against father for having caused her to be born a bastard).
App. 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
159. Cf. Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill.
160. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
161. Beath, Voluntary Sterilization, 63 Am.J. PUB. HEALTH 573 (1973).
162. Davis, supra note 57, at 512.
163. Sheppard, supra note 121, at 262-67, discusses the possible ramifications of a plaintiff
mother's unwed status.
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a matter of law, some courts have refused to allow recovery in this area by
raising the discredited64 specter of the difficulty in determining damages. 16 5
The weakness of this position is exposed by the dissenting opinion in Terrell
v. Garcia,60 which observed that evaluations very similar to those required to
determine the relative monetary values of the benefits and injuriess7 accompanying the birth of an unplanned child are constantly made in actions for
the wrongful death of children" 6s and in alienation of affection suits. 169
The wrongful death analogy, however, can be argued to defeat recovery as
well. The measure of damages in actions for the wrongful death of children is
the converse of that used in the unplanned birth cases: in the former, the
parent's damages for the loss of the enjoyment, affection, and services of the
child are reduced by the cost of the child's support. 7 0 The consistency with
which juries find that the cost of support is more than offset by the loss to the
parent" 7' can be construed as supporting the position that a living child is a
net benefit to his parents as a matter of law."72 Nevertheless, the law should
not draw support from what may well be jury abuse' 73 in one area to allow a
negligent defendant to escape liability in another.
CONCLUSION

There is little reason for refusing to allow a recovery by the reluctant
parent in cases of post-sterilization conception and birth. The simple expediencies of providing a complete preoperative consultation including disclosing the risk of recanalization, and of administering adequate postoperative
tests whereby a physician may protect himself from all but operative negligence do not seem particularly burdensome. Furthermore, recovery is supported by the general benefit flowing from a legal position that fosters care on
the part of physicians by holding them responsible for breaches of duty that
result in personal or pecuniary injuries to patients who have placed their
faith in the knowledge and skill of the physician.
With the current widespread employment of birth control devices, it is
164. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §52, at 512.
165. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Tex. App. 1973); cf. Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 29, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
166. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App. 1973).
167. Calculating the cost oF rearing children is not the sort of task that lends itself to
certainty. Expert estimates range from $5,617 to $34,464. See Dileo, Directions and Dimensions of Population Policy in the United States: Alternatives for Legal Reform, 46 TUL. L.
REv. 184, 227 n.191 (1971); Fuchsberg, Damages in Infants' Death Cases, 9 TRIAL LAW. Q.
63 (1973).
168. This is especially true in jurisdictions that allow recovery for bereavement, mental
anguish, loss of companionship, and society. See Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 670
(1923); FLA. STAT. §768.21(4) (1973).
169. 496 S.W.2d at 129.
170. See W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §127, at 908; cf. Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776
(Fla. 1954).
171. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §127, at 908.
172. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App. 1973).
173. Cases cited note 143 supra.
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